

# ‘Indeed’, ‘Really’, ‘In Fact’, ‘Actually’

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Interjections, such as those in the title, together with a few similar devices, when qualifying clauses expressing truth-conditions, or that such conditions have been satisfied, are entitled ‘force-amplifiers’. Disputes between deflationary and inflationary truth-theories sometimes are assumed to turn on the supposed pivotal role that these devices are construed as playing in the interpretation of the clauses they qualify. I argue that they are not dispensable add-ons. Moreover, even in their absence the relevant clauses giving truth-conditions permit interpretations that are not deflationary-friendly. I maintain that this is a significant fact about the use to which writers put them. I then defend a thesis about force-amplifiers that makes them indispensable to the interpretation of the relevant clauses, and that renders certain moves unavailable to popular deflationist treatments.

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## 1.

Consider interjections, such as those in the title, when occurring in clauses expressing either truth-conditions or that such conditions obtain. For example:

‘Coal is black’ is true if and only if coal really is black.

Fred believed the damage was due to a natural disaster and, indeed, it was due to an earthquake.

What she suspected was in fact the case.

The proposition that salamanders are lizards is true only if salamanders are actually lizards.

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It is not essential to the issues I shall raise that interjections like these be present. Sometimes a mere inflection, or the addition of a verbal particle will serve, as in 'He thought the earth moves and the earth *does* move'. I concentrate on the interjected words because they bring to the fore the point of this discussion. Let us call all such occurrences of words from this group (or their translations), even emphases, when, and only when, used in the stating of truth-conditions or their satisfaction (/non-satisfaction) *force-amplifiers*. Force-amplification is not the only role of these sorts of elements, perhaps not even their primary one. But, as I hope to show, it cannot be ignored; its regular undervaluing (viz., offhand dismissal) has had an impact on the give-and-take over theories of truth. Much later I extend the role of force-amplification beyond truth, to referential relations generally.<sup>1</sup> However, for the bulk of this essay I want to focus on truth. We may use the cover term 'signification' (verb: 'signify') for all the various semantic word-world, speaker-world, or thought-world relations covered (such as *predication* and *reference*) by such terms.

I shall use 'proposition', unless otherwise specified, as an all-purpose truth-bearer. Some have insisted that a proposition is what is expressed rather than the vehicle of expression. But when the *predicate* 'is true' or the *operator* 'it is true that' is deployed, philosophers have taken the term to apply to a sentence, an assertion (/statement), and, whenever *X* is a propositional attitude, what is *X*-ed. As used here 'proposition' can serve as a cover term for each of these candidate truth-bearers.<sup>2</sup>

Our four cases exemplify certain lessons. Some force-amplifiers occur in conditionals or biconditionals, others in conjunctions. The third case above shows that force-amplifiers need not occur in compounds and need not specify the proposition in question. The second one illustrates that words for truth need not occur in the formula, and that the truth-condition in question may be phrased differently from the proposition whose truth it is standing for. (For simplicity, and with one pointed exception, I employ only specifications which do not deviate in this way from those of their truth-bearers.) Nevertheless, each of the right-hand sides mentioned above specify a truth-condition (or, that one is met) for what is mentioned on the left-hand side of the formula. That feature is the focus of my discussion.

<sup>1</sup> This is an exception to the 'only'-restriction in the earlier formulation. I leave it unmodified because the exception is an isolated case, our interest throughout the bulk of this discussion is on truth-conditions, and the cases of stating truth or referential conditions does fix on the force-amplification role of these devices.

<sup>2</sup> The one thing it fails to cover are ultra-Russellian propositions that, having individuals and property-instances as their *constituents*, are indistinguishable from states of affairs and (would-be) facts.

The claim defended in this essay is that force-amplifiers supply instructions for taking the clauses they govern a certain way. They compel us to adopt what I later describe as a semantically differentiated reading (or interpretation). Some of those I am critiquing below, so-called “deflationary theorists” may accept that much. But, as I hope to show, that requires that we understand their signature formulas in ways incompatible with the conclusions they seek to draw from them. These points can be understood properly only after we have explained in greater detail what is meant by a semantically differentiated interpretation. However, getting clearer on semantically differentiated readings will require that we also say something about truth-condition specifications in which amplification is merely optional, which, in turn, takes us to the heart of deflationary theories of truth. We shall take up the first two of these (viz., semantically differentiated interpretations and optional readings) in subsequent sections, but I turn first to a brief sketch of deflationary theories of truth.

Deflationism (about truth, hereafter understood) embraces a broad spectrum of theories, in which one of two constructions plays a central role. The two, given here schematically, are:

(R) The proposition that  $p$  is true iff  $p$ . (Or ‘It is true that  $p$  iff  $p$ ’)

(T)  $S$  is true (in  $L$ ) iff  $p$

in which ‘ $S$ ’ contains a structural description (or, quotation name framed in object-language terms) of  $p$  in the relevant metalanguage. Deflationists regularly take one of these to yield basically adequate accounts of the concept *truth*.<sup>3</sup> (I henceforth call them and their respective instances ‘equivalences’.) Whenever the sentence/proposition in question is displayed, deflationists hold that this is all truth amounts to, while proposing supplementary accounts for occurrences in which the bearer is not, or cannot be, displayed. But (R) and (T) are believed to expose the structure for the general case, the one which concerns us. All deflationary theorists are committed, more or less explicitly, to the following two theses about these cases:

(D1) The central case shows that we can have an adequate account of truth without a metaphysical or relational theory of truth (say, correspondence or coherence).

<sup>3</sup> (R) in particular may create a worry about semantic paradoxes, a worry I set aside as orthogonal to the present discussion. If one prefers, one can think of an extremely long or inexhaustible list of instances of atomic propositions in (R)—one of the views called ‘minimalism’—as the relevant deflationist theory.

- (D2) What (R) and (T) show is that, in the central cases, whatever can be conveyed in a sentence or thought employing mention of truth can be more economically conveyed without it.<sup>4</sup>

By a correspondence theory I mean any view stating that truth is constituted by the relation of the truth-bearer to something on the order of a state of affairs, fact, circumstance, situation, or even by a combination of individuals and properties. The inspiration behind (D1) is to replace this sort of theory with one that lacks metaphysical or relational implications. Thus, by deflationism I intend to cover views that have typically gone under titles such as *redundancy*, *disquotationalism*, *minimalism*, and *prosententialism*.<sup>5</sup> Despite their significant differences, each puts their view forward as a candidate for the slot which correspondence might otherwise occupy, thus their commitments to (D1) and (D2). The exceptions—e.g., generalizations (say, ‘all propositions of the form ‘*p* or not *p*’ are true’), indirect descriptions (say, ‘what Smithers said is true’)—are supplied only to show what utility a truth predicate might nevertheless have.

My discussion proceeds as follows. In §2 I consider formulas in the spirit of (R) and (T), and introduce my target interpretation. In §3 Alfred Tarski’s view, the *locus classicus* of (T), is re-examined, largely because it is believed in some circles that Tarski’s pioneering work leads ineluctably to this sort of deflationism—a view I there reject. In §4 we return to the topic of force-amplifiers, explaining both the popular view I reject and one I defend. To strengthen my thesis, and weaken its leading alternative, in §5 I consider a series of occurrences of amplifiers in the literature. In §6 yet further support for my claims is discovered in implications for closely related uses of the entitled expressions. Finally, in §7 the thesis is extended to other referential relations.

## 2.

First, the equivalences. Consider the familiar instances of our two schemata:

<sup>4</sup> E.g. “...we find that in all sentences of the form ‘*p* is true,’ the phrase ‘is true’ is logically superfluous.” (Ayer 1946, 88). “[W]e can simply lop off ‘It is true that’ from (R) and it will make no difference to what we want to say.” (Williams 1992, 101).

Not every deflationist acknowledges (D2), and others have denied that deflationists are committed to it. But if they do not accept (D2), I do not see how they can believe they are entitled to (D1). That is not to imply that this is the whole of their argument: they point to other cases, in which semantic ascent is supposed to display the utility of a truth-predicate. But how could they claim it is the *whole* of the predicate’s utility without (D2)?

<sup>5</sup> Some writers who take one of these titles reject a commitment to deflationism. The distinction in §2 explains what enables them to do so.

‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white.

The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white.

These are the homophonic, or homographic, instances deflationists take as most illustrative of the force of their view. On them, to obtain the right-hand cognitive twin of the left-hand side, while scrapping the contentious truth predicate, for (R) we simply denominalize the proposition, or, for (T), disquote the sentence. (Regarding (T) this is a bit more involved because of the needed coordination between metalanguage and object language. I set aside the technical details here.) If this is the whole of the relevant point of the equivalences in the context, (D2) is the obvious lesson. We then obtain (D1) by showing that if so, there is no need to introduce the sorts of relations characterizing metaphysical theories of truth. (And if the message of (D2) is not instrumental here, it is difficult for me to see how else (D1) might be shown.) Call this reading of the equivalences *an austere gloss*. Some have concluded that it allows one’s account of truth to remain neutral with respect to any metaphysical implications of its concept or property, others draw the more ambitious conclusion that there is no need for worldly truthmakers anywhere. In either case, deflationism must be construed as involved in the same ballgame as correspondence and other traditional theories, for it promotes itself as a competing answer to a common set of questions.

Deflationists are thus committed to an austere gloss. But there is another, and (I believe) more natural, interpretation of the equivalences than austerity—a *semantically differentiated interpretation* (or, more simply, a *differentiated interpretation*).

To start us off, notice that once we look past the occurrence of ‘is true’, the most salient difference between the sides of both schematic equivalences is the following. Their left-hand sides contain compound singular terms<sup>6</sup> whose instances designate, express, or represent *semantically evaluable* items: nouns formed with propositional clauses and names of sentences. By this I do not mean that those phrases *take* semantic values such as true, but rather that what they *designate* are themselves creatures of semantics (propositions and sentences, respectively). How else could grammar allow them to take distinctively semantic predicates? However, save for specialized topics, in general the right-hand side of each does not take a semantic value. Although the vehicle in the formulas is a sentential phrase, differential interpretation reads the right-hand side as “talking about” nothing but worldly (largely nonsemantic) items. A first temptation might be to say that *p* introduces a state of affairs or a fact; and at least on the face of things states of affairs

<sup>6</sup> I write loosely as if the schematic letters, and not just their substituends are designating expressions.

and facts are not semantic units. While that seems to me to be *basically* correct, it may be contested—indeed, has been—on two counts.

First, objections have been raised against the philosophical usefulness of notions such as *state of affairs* and *fact*, or against principles for individuating them. I shall not probe these allegations further here,<sup>7</sup> but simply note that although some nondeflationists (= inflationists) also accept such objections, it has not prevented them from recognizing something or other as a truth-maker that is not evaluable in semantic terms. Thus, unless it is assumed that those philosophers are all quite confused, this is scarcely a mortal blow to nondeflationist interpretations.

Second, it is sometimes claimed that representational notions such as mentioning, referring, naming, designating, denoting, signifying, expressing, or even representing itself do not apply at the level of whole sentences. Notoriously, Frege thought that a sentence had a *Bedeutung* or object to which it referred. For standard, extensional cases he chose its truth or falsity. Even when philosophers suppose that whole sentences refer, Frege's solution is not widely accepted nowadays, save as a premiss from which to construct *reductios* against certain theories of truth, causation, or fact. And problems about the way in which sententially-articulated entities represent, or what they represent, persist.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, it seems beyond question that many instances of *p* have individuable and identifiable subject-matters. They introduce a specific target in a way not limited to the designations of their isolated subject-terms or to extensions of their predicates. Consider a straightforward subject-predicate sentence—say, 'Smithers is awake'. We may take the subject-matter of the proposition expressed by that sentence (on an occasion of use) as including both the subject referred to and the property or action expressed as belonging to (or denied of) that subject. Of course, the proposition might be false, in which case Smithers does not have the property ascribed to him. Nevertheless, the whole package forms the subject-matter of this sort of proposition. Thus, the sentence is, in this broader sense, about *Smithers being awake*, or about a combination (plus a certain structure) of Smithers, the relation of *being in* or *having*, and the state of wakefulness. To deny that there is a distinctive subject-matter here commits one to the view that the sentence's semantics does not suit it for stating one sort of thing any more than any other sentence would—say, the sentences 'the blade is rusty' or 'Smithers is a Rotarian'. And if one goes that far, it is hard to see how we can account, in ordinary circumstances, for our indispensable practice of choosing any particular sentence rather than any other to convey what we want to communicate. Whatever difficulties there

<sup>7</sup> Dealt with more fully in (Vision 2004, ch 3.1)

are in formulating this point rigorously, the need for some such relationship is unavoidable on any serious scheme. I shall henceforth use the term ‘subject-matter’ for the sort of thing that is relevant to a sentence (or a sentence *as used*) in this way. And, as with austere glosses, on differentiated interpretations we can extend the notion to other combinations of contents, in particular to conjunctions such as that in our second example—viz., ‘Fred believed the damage was due to a natural disaster and, indeed, it was due to an earthquake’.

What has been said thus far is compatible with a broad selection of different views about how to construe the notion of a subject-matter. Still, it is clear that whatever the details, the subject-matter of replacements for *p* in our equivalences are not likely to be semantically evaluable creatures as such. In a standard sort of case, they will be states or would-be states of the world. In the rare case, they may be about what is semantically evaluable. Thus, in the instance:

*The proposition that snow is white is true* is true if and only if  
that snow is white is true

a phrase on the right-hand side (‘that snow is white’) designates something that is semantically evaluable. But this results from special features of the case at hand, not from a general trait of such equivalences. That the subject-matter of the right-hand side is not a semantically evaluable unit *per se* is a striking feature whose implications threaten the deflationist line. Deflationists encourage us to pay attention to little more than the similar phrasing of the two sides, and conclude simply that the equivalences show that what has been stated with the predicate ‘is true’ can be stated without it, or that “nothing is added to the thought by ascribing to it the property of truth” (Frege 1999, 88).<sup>8</sup>

Still, the case for semantically-differentiated interpretations need not rest on the idea of a subject-matter. Suppose there are no worldly correlates for whole sentences. Then let us say that the right-hand sides acquire their semantic connections simply via their incorporated referential terms and the designations or expressions of their predicates and relational expressions. Combining these elements need constitute no unit such as a “fact” or “state of affairs” that we can then deploy for theorizing.

The right-hand side can pick out worldly-conditions or a series of them, which may produce the truth-conditions for the proposition or sentence on the left-hand side. It may then follow that because we have arrived at this

<sup>8</sup> Is Frege then a deflationist? I refuse to enter into this exegetical quagmire. But comments such as the one cited here have certainly inspired others who definitely consider themselves deflationists.

by nothing more than reflection on the equivalences, truth's connection to things and properties in the world should not be excluded from its concept. The foregoing considerations leave it open that the relation may be one-many, but not that the formula as a whole is to be taken nonrelationally. There is a legitimate philosophical difference over the existence of factlike entities, on which it is certainly an option to take a nominalist or eliminativist view. But to suppose that the position one takes, say, on facts versus individuals-plus-properties can mark a distinction between relational and nonrelational theories of truth would mislocate that difference. In (D1) it is denied that a proposition's worldly connections, including those of its subpropositional ingredients, enter our concept of truth. That commitment requires much more than scrapping facts and their kin. On the other hand, a nondeflationist, say a correspondence theorist, need only insist that it is integral to our concept of truth that, at least in the central cases, reality makes bearers true or false. This modest claim is enough to set up a relational theory of truth, whatever the details.<sup>9</sup> To create a true alternative to relational views a deflationist must disclaim as canonical all differential interpretations of the equivalences. However, because the right-hand side contains no semantically evaluable item *de jure* we cannot rely only on the similarity in appearance of the formulas on both sides as showing that they convey just the same thing. By itself this is enough to undermine efforts to extract from the equivalences the lesson of (D2). In the usual case, the right-hand side delivers a worldly condition, or a combination of worldly ingredients, accounting for the applicability of the truth predicate in its other term.

Even here, some will protest that deflationists can, and do, accept a differentiated reading of (R) and (T) if all that amounts to is that the left-hand side must contain something semantically evaluable while the right-hand need not. But it is not altogether unheard of for theorists to help themselves to platitudes which their prior commitments prohibit. And I have yet to see what deflationists, even recent *soi-disant* "minimalists", believe can be made of the right-hand side of the equation while maintaining (D1).<sup>10</sup> Perhaps the response is that they are entitled to a semantically differentiated read-

<sup>9</sup> For simplicity I ignore the variation of a correspondence theory holding that it is only the *property* of truth, not its *concept*, that need be correspondentist, as well as the deflationary view that although truth's metaphysical liaisons are excluded from its *concept*, the *property* of truth may allow them back in.

<sup>10</sup> Although I believe the view both controversial, and, even if true, patently inadequate (see Vision 2004, 131–134), it has been so widely held that *all* a deflationist (or minimalist) needs to claim about the equivalences is that the two sides have the same truth-conditions that I mention it here just to acknowledge that this possibility has not been overlooked. Why cannot an inflationist hold this? If she can, what is distinctive about deflationism? And how could anything so blatantly circular be a theory of truth?



ing because no proposition is explicitly invoked on the right-hand side of their formulas (and, thus, that side cannot be semantically evaluated). But this seems to me to leave their position up in the air. If minimalists fail to invoke a proposition on the right-hand side of their equivalences *only because* they take their construction to be neutral with respect to the proper correlate for a correspondence theorist, *or* to the debate between the various truth theories (e.g., correspondence, coherence, and pragmatism), *or* both, then they simply fail to say enough. The more specific views on which they refuse to settle are all substantive—thus, relational and metaphysical. One has not produced an *alternative* to a list of substantive views just by failing to opt for one of its items. A genus is not an alternative to, or in competition with, its various species. On the other hand, if the lack of commitment to a substantive truth theory is intended to mark the fact that nothing on the right-hand side remains to be specified (for the concept of truth), it is hard to see how they can avoid committing themselves to the view that the only relevant thing is the proposition displayed there. That appears to be a basic move to (D2). But, if we are to avoid the absurd conclusion that propositions in which truth is explicitly ascribed (either predicated or prefaced in a sentential operator) are in general *made true* by the proposition obtained when we amputate the truth ascription, then the formulas, as understood by minimalists, can tell us no more about truth than is revealed by examples such as:

The proposition that snow is white is true iff le jugement que la neige est blanche est vrai.

That formula certainly does not yield the conditions for the truth of the proposition that snow is white, but tells us at most that two propositions (or two expressions of one proposition) have the same truth-conditions. The fact that “they” are true or false together is not evidence, as some might declare, that the left-hand proposition does not have or need any truth-conditions beyond the specifier in the instances of (R). If we are to understand the right-hand side of (R) in this way, it provides nothing more than my hybrid English-French specimen. Finally, if the deflationist declines any of these understandings of her equivalences, the view has yet to tell us anything. We have an elementary understanding of what the words on the right-hand side mean, but not of what they signify. Thus, while we grasp something, we do not yet know what is being affirmed.

A hint of the problem may be contained in my deliberately unguarded use of ‘gloss’ in the phrase ‘austere gloss’. A gloss may range from a statement of a lesson learned from a construction to a reformulation (either *qua* analysis or paraphrase) of what is literally conveyed in it. Setting aside issues of conversational implicature, let us grant that reflection on instances

of (R) may, in some sense, reveal that we convey more economically with the right-hand side of the biconditional just the message that we could convey with the words on the left-hand side. That may be a lesson of these instances. (Of course, this only applies to cases in which the proposition in question is explicitly displayed, not to cases like 'What she said is true'.) However, it would be a mistake to infer from this alone that it makes the right-hand side an adequate *analysis* or *paraphrase* of what is expressed on the left-hand side. I doubt that any worthy deflationist has been taken in by the vagaries of 'gloss' to commit this non-sequitur. But it is not implausible to venture that some have wrongly inferred from what we can take away as a lesson of these instances to the conclusion that the two sides convey (that is, semantically express) the same thing.

In light of the possibility of differentiated interpretation, we must be circumspect when construing what others have intended when displaying (T) or (R) in their expositions. For it would be a mistake to suppose that authors have not been at least implicitly aware of this distinction between their right and left sides. In fact, it seems clear that a differentiated interpretation is a quite natural one across the board. Some who have supposed that word-world relations were essential to any concept of truth, whether or not they have been full-blown correspondence theorists, have also accepted the equivalences, and, on occasion have supposed that their substantial, relational truth theories could be extracted from a proper reading of them.<sup>11</sup> Whereas deflationists have been quick to deny that these theorists have succeeded, they have been less solicitous in trying to come to grips with just what nondeflationists might have had in mind, or why the latter could even have regarded them as insurance against a deflationary reading. Might not it be the case that what metaphysical truth theorists were up to is readily explained by the fact that they noted (what deflationists have been at pains to suppress) just this differentiation in the two sides?

In introducing a semantically-differentiated interpretation of the equivalences I am *not* claiming that the deflationist cannot rely on an austere gloss of the equivalences to argue her case. For one thing, there are many arguments for deflationism that have nothing to do with this issue. A deflationist can regard an austere gloss as a consequence of those other arguments. (I do claim that a reliance on the view that an austere gloss is the only one in play has unwelcome consequences for the final position. Although this might be a blow against the individual arguments for deflationism, that would require a more thorough analysis of those arguments than is intended here.) For another thing, a deflationist can still maintain that just because the left-hand term can be replaced without loss by the right-hand term, whatever

<sup>11</sup> E.g. Alston (1996), McGinn (2000), Van Cleve (1996).

worldly conditions the latter or its ingredients may gesture toward has nothing to do with truth. (This seems to have been factored into the thinking of some authors.<sup>12</sup>) This familiar deflationist strategy is consistent with acknowledging a differentiated interpretation. Nevertheless, once we allow a differentiated interpretation, the dialectical prospects are narrowed. Certain moves no longer work. For one thing, the differentiated interpretation is a sufficient explanation of why a nondeflationist can acknowledge the equivalences. Thus, it is unwarranted to suppose that an austere interpretation is all that users of the equivalence could have had in mind. In this connection, it is a mistake to suppose that inflationary theorists commit a tactical error, possibly a fatal one, in accepting one of these equivalences. Both claims seem to rely on the implausible assumption that the equivalences themselves are sufficient to warrant an austere gloss without benefit of further argument or explanation.

### 3.

I just alluded to disputes surrounding differential and austere readings of the equivalences. A good start in coming to appreciate the role of these disagreements is the battle for the allegiance of Alfred Tarski. Tarski's Convention T (to a close enough approximation, our (T)) has been central in such disagreements. While many commentators regard Tarski as providing at least the skeleton of an inflationist, if not a correspondence, view, there can be no question that (T), along with (R), has inspired much deflationary theory. In fact, some deflationists, including Wolfgang Künne, take Tarski for one of their own, ignoring the counterevidence for a differential reading by, among other things, soft-pedaling his use of force-amplifiers. Let us take a closer look at some relevant Tarskian text and Künne's commentary on it.

Apparently out of step with what was to become a popular tune for (T)'s later employments, Tarski had written, "We regard the truth of a sentence as its 'agreement with reality'" (Tarski 1983b, 404). And in the introduction to the classical exposition of his view, (Tarski 1983a, 153), he states, "throughout this work I shall be concerned exclusively with grasping the intentions which are contained in the so-called classical conception of truth ('true—agreeing with reality')". On its most natural reading, those words imply that truth is a relation between something broadly linguistic and normally extra-linguistic ingredients and a differentiated interpretation of the equivalences. Moreover, in a later summary of those views he notes Aristotle's famous dictum on 'is false' and 'is true', and suggests that what it affirms, updated, is captured in:

<sup>12</sup> Perhaps David Lewis, e.g., (Lewis 2001) and Soames (1999).

- (i) The truth of a sentence consists in agreement with (or correspondence to) reality (Tarski 1949, 54).

Immersing himself yet more deeply in inflationism, he writes that if we are allowed to use the notion of designation to apply to whole sentences (and not just names), “we could possibly use” the following:

- (ii) A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs (Tarski 1949, 54).

The stunning fact about these mutually reinforcing passages is that Tarski seems willing to take on board such crucial features of inflationism in his paraphrases: in (i) ‘in agreement with reality’ is interpreted as ‘correspondence to’, and in (ii) the correlate of a true sentence is described as “an existing state of affairs”. Tarski quickly abandons mention of states of affairs, but he does not suggest that such items are illicit. Rather, he gives reasons for declining the use the expression in his project: first, because, as an element of vague “commonplace language”, it does not give us any reason to believe that its theory will be consistent (viz., will enable us to avoid familiar paradoxes), and, second, there is no need to mention states of affairs explicitly in his subsequent rigorous reformulations. Perhaps he shares the doubts aired in §2 about the very idioms by means of which we inaugurate facts and states of affairs into our conversation. But, that is not a reason he gives for refusing to talk about them. At most his grounds indicate that if we can have such intuitively appealing results without needing them to advance our theories, so much the better. Tarski’s published objections go no farther. To avoid employing them in one’s theory is not to discountenance them in one’s ontology, especially if the alternative formulations are thought to be tantamount to the old ones. Indeed, the employment of phrases such as ‘agreement with... reality’ and ‘existing state of affairs’ in (i) and (ii), suggests that aside from their vagueness, they are not ontologically objectionable. Perhaps Tarski believed otherwise, but the passages typically cited for that claim do not even begin to make out the case for it.

Against this, Wolfgang Künne holds that it is a mistake to take such remarks to indicate that Tarski harbored a relational (= inflationary) conception of truth. He points out that immediately after explaining that a sentence’s truth is its *agreement with reality* Tarski adds:

This rather vague phrase, which can certainly lead to various misunderstandings and has often done so in the past, is interpreted as follows... [W]e shall accept as valid every sentence of the form ‘the sentence *x* is true if and only if *p*’ where ‘*p*’ is to be replaced by any sentence of the language under investigation and ‘*x*’ by any individual name of that sentence (Tarski 1983a, 404).

Künne states that this shows that “the correspondence formula is elucidated with the help of T-equivalences” (Künne 2003, 210). He tacitly assumes that this undermines Tarski’s use of the correspondence formula as a way of showing that he was seriously explicating, or conforming to, a relational notion of truth.

This line of argument assumes an austere interpretation of the equivalences. However, in light of the existence of semantically-differentiated interpretations, it is not only possible, but quite natural, for Tarski to have seen in the distinction mentioned between the relevant occurrences of ‘S’ (or ‘x’) and ‘p’ just the sort of relation between words and world that earlier correspondentists were striving to express, albeit less rigorously. Unless Künne gives us reason to rule out differentiated readings, his claim is groundless. Beyond that, to suppose that Tarski was advancing an austere gloss suggests that he was being cagy in displaying (i) and (ii) as ways to interpret his views. Such surreptition would be quite out of character for a writer who was generally scrupulously clear in his expositions.

Still, there is more to Künne’s case for austerity. He believes we must interpret Tarski’s phrases in light of their treatment by his teacher, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, to whom the *Wahrheitsbegriff* is dedicated. And, indeed, in an early footnote (1983a, 153n), Tarski states of the latter’s *Gnosiology*, “in writing the present article I have repeatedly consulted this book and in many points adhered to the terminology there suggested.” Furthermore, when Tarski (in Künne’s restatement) gives as his proposition (1):

For all sentences  $x$ ,  $x$  is true  $\iff x$  means that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so (Künne 2003, 347), translation of Tarski (1983a, 155).<sup>13</sup>

he adds in a footnote that “very similar formulations are found in T. Kotarbiński..., where they are treated as commentaries which explain approximately the classical view of truth” (Tarski 1983a, 155n). Künne concludes that we should turn to Kotarbiński for a deeper understanding of Tarski’s superficially inflationary prose.

We shall consider Kotarbiński’s own use of force-amplifiers, and Künne’s commentary on them, in the next section. But, that aside, let us simply return to Künne’s simple claim that Kotarbiński’s understanding of truth is deflationary, “without any appeal to the notion of facts, but in thoroughly non-relational terms” (Künne 2003, 209). In a passage we discuss more fully

<sup>13</sup> In the *Wahrheitsbegriff* Woodger translates *Sachen* as ‘state of affairs’ in the two places where Künne prefers ‘things’. I follow Künne’s version in order to put his own view in its strongest light by, first, not slanting Tarski toward a relational interpretation where this is avoidable, and, second, bringing out what he notes as the striking similarity between Tarski’s and Kotarbiński’s formulations of the classical conception of truth.

later, Kotarbiński mentions someone thinking not the truth, but *truly*. For Künne this shows Kotarbiński believed truth should be treated adverbially, as a modification of the episode (act? state? process?) of thinking or belief. That is analogous to adverbialism with respect to perceptual content, in which the content clause of a perceptual verb is treated as a modification of the experience: crudely, 'S sees something red' is understood on adverbialism as 'S sees something-redly'. Similarly, truth is to be understood primarily in terms of the adverb 'truly', which is in turn explained by the formula:

$$'(K) x \text{ thinks truly} \iff (x \text{ thinks that... and...})'$$

where the blanks are filled uniformly.<sup>14</sup> Again according to Künne, Kotarbiński's *Reism*, in which neither propositions nor any other brand of abstract entities exist, dictates that this adverb of manner, qualifying *x*'s thinking, is the primary alethic notion. Nonadverbial truth and falsity are to be ultimately analyzed as qualifications of occasions of holding true. There is nothing here, no mention of facts or states of affairs, on which to hang a relation between a verbal something and the nonverbal world. Thus, when Kotarbiński writes that in characterizing the classical theory of truth, although "[i]n the classical interpretation, truly means in accordance with reality" (Kotarbiński 1966, 106), he qualifies this by stating that "brief reflection suffices to recognize the metaphorical nature of such comparison. A different interpretation of 'accordance with reality' is required" (Kotarbiński 1966, 107). Künne maintains that that interpretation is given by (K).

In opposition to Künne's construal, I maintain, first, that Tarski cannot have held an adverbialist or reist theory; second, that adverbialism and Reism are not even relevant to interpreting Kotarbiński here; and, finally, in the context Kotarbiński is not holding that a relational reading of truth (or its predicate or adverb) is up for consideration. Let us examine these points in order.

1. The clearly adverbial language Kotarbiński uses should not be enough to read adverbialism even into his own philosophy. But let us suppose it is. Although the language in which Kotarbiński's line of argument is couched is not as transparent as we might hope, he seems to be most intent on denying the existence of abstract entities, such as propositions ( $\approx$  Fregean *Gedanken*), or types of sentences, statements, belief contents, etc. This led him to insist on a concrete truth-bearer; and the token believed (not the believing itself, but what is believed) had to be a concrete something. Presumably he could not find anything conforming to his restriction, and to which he could attach truth, other than the state of belief itself. He wished to avoid reintroducing an abstraction via a conceptually distinguishable content. Conceivably this

<sup>14</sup> (Künne 2003, 344). He is not himself convinced that the view works.

led him to suppose that he must attach it to the verb of belief itself, thus leading him to favor an adverbial construction over a predicative one.

If that is roughly the route by which Kotarbiński arrived at his conclusion, there is no way to accommodate it in Tarski's philosophy. For one thing, Tarski is not concerned with the objects of belief, but with language(s). For another, his truth-bearers are (type) sentences, and not sentences-qua-asserted. Accordingly, there is no episode—of asserting, believing, entertaining, etc.—to be described verbally. Thus, there is nothing to which to attach such an adverb. Tarski's views are quite out of the range of this sort of tinkering. If the adverbial treatment is therefore an essential ingredient in the case for reinterpreting 'accordance with reality', as Künne presents it, it is difficult to see how it can bear on Tarski's view.

2. When Tarski is most explicit about using Kotarbiński's terminology as a guide to his own (Tarski 1983a, 153n1), the latter is discussing the respective merits of classical (correspondence) and utilitarian (Jamesian pragmatist) theories of truth. And although Kotarbiński frames things in terms of 'truly' as well as 'true' (Kotarbiński 1966, 106–7), that is not the point he is trying to get across, or the one Tarski seems intent on expressing in the context. The feature of each theory being stressed, for both Kotarbiński and Tarski, is their respective type of truthmaker, *accordance with reality* in the one case, *useful in some respect* in the other.

3. Toward the end of section 17 of *Gnosiology*, shortly following his explanations of classical and utilitarian views, Kotarbiński offers a critique of what he takes to be a typical classical theory's understanding of 'accordance with reality.' This is the passage on which Künne relies for his claim that Kotarbiński eschews a relational understanding of truth. This makes it crucial for the interpretation of Tarski before us. But although Kotarbiński uses *truly* here as well as *true*, an adverbial reading is, again, not in question. Rather, he states only that the *accord* in question cannot be taken pictographically, in the way a photograph or portrait is meant to resemble its subject. He rightly notes that 'good copy or simile', as it serves in classical theory, is merely a metaphor. Künne cannot get the mileage out of this caveat that he requires. Options are readily available for a robust notion of accordance with reality that do not rely on a *literal* comparison with pictographic or point-for-point concordances. Moreover, a number of correspondence theorists have not been under the sway of picture theories of meaning or truth.<sup>15</sup> Kotarbiński

<sup>15</sup> See, e.g. J. L. Austin (Austin 1961, 93): "There is no need whatsoever for the words used in making a true statement to 'mirror' in any way, however indirect, any feature whatsoever of the situation or event; a statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the 'multiplicity', say, or the 'structure' or 'form' of reality, than a word needs to be echoic or writing pictographic."

does not say in this place what a better understanding might be. However, even in the absence of a positive alternative, it is not very persuasive that giving up the pictographic model of *accordance with reality* leads directly to such severe conceptual surgery, leaving no room for any palpable relational reading of the phrase. It would be overreading this passage to take 'agreement with reality' in such an unusually narrow way, much less as an argument to the effect that Kotarbiński convinced Tarski to give up a relational conception of truth.

Thus far I have not mentioned force-amplifiers. But they do intrude and significantly hamper Künne's take on Tarski. Earlier I followed Künne's rendition into semi-formal English of Tarski's (1): 'For all sentences  $x$ ,  $x$  is true  $\iff x$  means that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so'. But Künne not only replaces the phrase 'states of affairs' (occurring in the standard English translation) by 'things', but also omits the telling word, 'indeed', that even he could not wholly overlook. Künne's full translation is:

a true sentence is one which means *that things are thus and so, and things (indeed) are thus and so*.

The italicized phrase is the direct translation of the crucial part of the sentence from which Künne constructs (1); and aside from the parentheses around 'indeed', it is a close literal translation of Tarski's words as they appear in German.<sup>16</sup> However, Künne seems confident in omitting that word from his English rendering of Tarski's (1), because, he claims, "Tarski himself stressed ['indeed's'] redundancy" in §18 of (1949) (Künne 2003, 347n96). What Tarski writes in that place is:

It has been claimed that—due to the fact that a sentence like 'snow is white' is taken to be semantically true if snow is *in fact* white...—logic finds itself involved in a most uncritical realism (Tarski 1949, 71).

(Notice that in the original English Tarski writes 'in fact' rather than 'indeed'.) However, rather than stressing *in fact's* (or *indeed's*) *redundancy*, quite the contrary Tarski maintains that it imports content of the wrong kind. He begins by noting that the words 'in fact' are misleading "even if they do not affect the content." But do they affect the content? Tarski's clear verdict is that they do, because "these words convey the impression that the semantic conception of truth is intended to establish the conditions under which we are warranted in asserting any given sentence" (Tarski 1949, 71). Put otherwise, he holds that they have an epistemic force, a suggestion of assertibility

<sup>16</sup> Although Künne also displays the original Polish, of which I have no knowledge, if the force-amplifier did not appear in Polish it strikes me as unlikely that Tarski would have inserted it in his German version, or that Künne would have needed to make the point he does about its redundancy.



conditions. That is how he takes the charge of an *uncritical realism* here. That particular interpretation of ‘in fact’ appears to me, as I think it will to most, mistaken. Nevertheless, to reject ‘in fact’ because of its alleged epistemic liaisons is not to agree with Künne that it is merely redundant, and Tarski’s assessment does not give us a clue about what he might have thought of its presence if he was not under this misimpression about its assertibility implications.

#### 4.

Kotarbiński, too, uses force-amplifiers. Consider the following passage:

‘Jan thinks truly if and only if  
Jan thinks that things are thus and so,  
and things are *indeed* thus and so’  
... For instance, the central idea of the Copernican theory is... that the  
earth revolves around the sun; now Copernicus thought truly, for he  
thought that the earth revolves around the sun, and the earth does  
revolve around the sun.<sup>17</sup>

Künne (2003, 344) remarks of the occurrence of ‘*indeed*’ in the first sentence that it is “logically redundant.” Elsewhere he states of a similar occurrence that it is a “logically superfluous adverb.” Let us call such assessments *dismissive*. Other than telling what force ‘indeed’ does not have, he does not say what role it might have in such utterances. A common view accompanying dismissive accounts is that force-amplifiers merely emphasize, are emphatic ways of putting forward, the content they qualify. For the special case of amplifiers—viz., this class of phrases, inflections, etc. used in clauses stating truth-conditions or that they have (/have not) been satisfied—I want to *contrast* dismissive accounts with what we may call *robust* ones. A robust account regards the amplifiers as affecting our understanding of the truth conditions of the clauses in which they occur. Generally speaking, they can be robust in one of two ways. First, they might interject additional content in those clauses (say, as a sentential operator on the order of ‘it is necessary that’). Second, they may be more like instructions on how to understand the clause. This last partition is not any sharper than the troubled division between semantics and pragmatics. But there are clear cases on both sides. Eventually, I shall offer a robust account of the second type. But first I want to examine more closely the character of dismissive accounts.

<sup>17</sup> Kotarbiński, as quoted, and translated (from German), in (Künne 2003, 343). The first sentence of the English translation from Polish (Kotarbiński 1966, 107) reads “John thinks truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, and things *in fact* are so and so” (my emphasis).

It is not uncommon to find those who agree with Künne's negative assessment of 'indeed' and other amplifiers. Given the context to which I have restricted force-amplification (viz., the formulation of truth-conditions or an affirmation that they have, or have not, been met) it is usually made quite explicit that this enables one to give an *austere gloss* of the passage as distinct from a *differentiated reading*. Thus, for Künne, Kotarbiński's sentence conveys no more than if the latter wrote 'Jan thinks truly if and only if Jan thinks that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so'. Bearing in mind that the sentence must be enunciated without any emphasis in the second clause, this construal strikes me as inherently implausible. Has 'indeed' no role beyond being decorative? Of course, austerity is not mandated by Künne's account of the force-amplifier. But assuming an austere account is a possibility, adopting it removes a serious obstacle to a deflationary interpretation of this passage.

It seems equally implausible that the whole point of 'indeed' here is to add emphasis to an independent claim. As mentioned earlier, the expressions cited as force-amplifiers are sometimes used merely for emphasis. If I unfairly doubted that Smith's intention to enroll in law school was serious, someone might reply 'He really did enroll', or 'In fact, he enrolled'. As a matter of fact, each of the terms cited from this class may be strictly used as an emphasizer when not behaving as a force-amplifier, and that employment may be its more central use. Thus, remarks such as the following are in perfectly good order:

In fact, the older version of the software works better.

Indeed, the highest paid player earns more than the team owner.

Actually, I'd rather finish reading this chapter first.

Really, you mean to say that she never had formal musical training!

However, when what is at issue is what to make of the constructions in the contexts to which force-amplification has been restricted, that account struggles. But before formally presenting my competing force-amplification thesis let us briefly examine the larger point Künne wishes his dismissive commentary to serve.

He is defending a deflationist interpretation of Kotarbiński. The logical negligibility of *indeed* brings the latter's view in line with (R). But equally, the ability to dismiss the contribution of force-amplification in interpreting its phrases supports Künne's own deflationary view, a view he calls a modest account of truth, or MOD. It is summarized in the formula:

$$\forall x(x \text{ is true} \iff \exists p(x = [p] \ \& \ p))^{18}$$

in which the brackets around ' $p$ ' are singular-term-forming operators and can be rendered as the phrase 'the proposition that...'. Their function is to take us from a sentence expressing a certain proposition to a term designating that proposition.

MOD is deflationary because it implies that an adequate account of the notion or property truth (or the predicate 'is true') need not invoke any of a true proposition's relations to a nonsemantic, nonepistemic reality. It is played off against what I earlier called, using Künne's preferred terminology, a *relational* account. MOD is, in brief, a refinement of (R), the proposition that  $p$  is true if and only if  $p$ . For Künne, Kotarbiński not only lends a cachet of respectable lineage to his own account, but his way of achieving his view is an integral part of Künne's own rationale. But if Kotarbiński is to be perceived as clearing the path for deflationism, it must be explained why the presence of 'indeed' in the quoted passage does not destroy the picture. This is the background against which Künne dismisses force-amplifiers.

The biconditionals in (R) and (T) differ from the Kotarbiński passage in two respects that may be ignored for our purposes. First, the contrast in question is between the sentences (or propositions) on the left- and right-hand sides of the biconditional rather than between a pair of conjuncts occurring only on the right. Second, the sentences on the right side of the equivalences need not be, and given their purposes will not be, compounds. (Given recursion, we do not require separate truth-theorems for (truth-functional) compounds.) But all that matters is that precisely the same issues concerning force-amplifiers arise here. Still, in light of the problems already uncovered with austere interpretations, Künne's interpretation would be no boon to a (supposedly) deflationary Kotarbiński.

Rehearsing some of the steps in §2, I cited a potential ambiguity in the way the equivalences could be, and have been, regarded, between a semantically differentiated interpretation and the austere gloss or interpretation that deflationists should favor. Disregarding the various objections I made to the deflationist interpretation, what concerns us now is only the fact that it has been put into prominent play in the literature. This alone supplies a sufficient motive for those who want to avoid being so understood to signify as much, and therefore to make clear that what they have in mind is the need to import the extralinguistic world to explain truth. By now it should not surprise anyone that I am suggesting that this is the core role of force-amplifiers:

<sup>18</sup> (Künne 2003, 337). I ignore the issue, raised by MOD, of quantification over sentences. Künne squarely confronts it, and argues that he is entitled to it without resorting to substitutional quantification

- (FA) *Force-amplifiers, when used in constructions stating truth-conditions (say, in conjunctions and biconditionals), or stating that the conditions have been satisfied, dictate that the compound is to be given a semantically differentiated interpretation.*

That, harmlessly simplified, is the thesis I am defending. (FA) is proposed as sufficient and central for force-amplification, not as necessary. It is not intended to exhaust the contexts of such amplifiers. In the third example with which this essay opened—‘What she suspected was in fact the case’—no compound occurs and the contents of her suspicion are not disclosed. Moreover, force-amplifiers may also be used to *deny* that the truth-conditions have been satisfied. When used in those circumstances, only a limited class of amplifiers are appropriate. However, I want to begin by defending (FA) in cases in which truth-conditions, or their satisfaction, are expressed. We may then extend that role to closely parallel cases. (Some are discussed in §6.)

The crucial feature of our targeted cases is that two contents are displayed or implied, and the contents of the two sides are very similarly worded, no doubt suspiciously so to some. It is not credible to suppose that there is no point to this ritualized repetition. In the first part, there is a semantically-evaluable proposition—something it is possible to regard as taking a semantic value, most importantly a truth-value. Occasionally the proposition is not given in full, or is given only indirectly. However, the phrasing assures us of the availability of a similar content specifiable at the other end. Or, in cases mentioned below, in which the force-amplifiers are used to affirm the falsity of the content, the second proposition may be like the first but for the presence (/absence) of a crucial negative element lacking (/present) in the first one. In the clearest cases, such as the first sentence of the quote that opened this section, the repetition of the proposition is right there on the surface. And if we held that the force-amplifiers were doing no more than underlining the preceding utterance, we would be led to the view that the utterer was saying one thing, and then simply repeating herself emphatically a second time. This would be scarcely more promising than rejecting a differentiated interpretation without any alternative to offer.

In sum, it is in contexts where expressions from our designated class attach either to a display of a truth-condition for a statement, sentence, belief, etc., or to an affirmation that the condition for truth (or falsity) has obtained, that they serve as differentiated interpretations for force-amplifiers. Accordingly, I maintain that the occurrence of ‘indeed’ in the Kotarbiński passage is robust; it signals his differentiated interpretation of the truth formula. Künne states, following what he takes to be Bolzano’s view, that it “is logically redundant: it serves the same purpose as the move in that same

quotation from ‘revolves’ to ‘does revolve’”. But what Künne takes this second part of the passage to illustrate is no more persuasive than his account of the first one. When Kotarbiński states that Copernicus “thought that the earth revolves around the sun”, then adds that the earth does revolve around the sun, the inflection (however slight) we give to ‘does’ in the second conjunct supplies more than mere a repetition of the content of Copernicus’s thought. It indicates that the thought is true, *because* the conditions for its being so have been satisfied.<sup>19</sup> Merely to state that someone thought something affirms nothing, as such, about that thought’s truth.

Curiously enough Künne inadvertently and implicitly attests at least to the range of force-amplifiers by his own summary of his interpretation. He writes, “A proposition X is true, according to the modest account, if and only if things *really* are *as* they are according to X” (Künne 2003, 373, first emphasis mine), and earlier he stated “When is Jan thinking truly (that is, in agreement with reality) that there are bears in the Carpathians? Just in case Jan is thinking that there are bears in the Carpathians, *and* there *really* are bears in the Carpathians” (Künne 2003, 209, second emphasis mine). I do not see how Künne can avoid agreeing with me that these occurrences of ‘really’ are performing precisely the same job as is performed by ‘indeed’ and ‘in fact’ in the earlier examples. But, then, for Künne they must be “logically redundant’ and, thus, negligible”—the very conclusion he reaches about our instance of ‘indeed’. Why bother inserting them? That they make some difference can be seen by trying to rewrite them with ‘really’ deleted. But can Künne tell us what difference they make? Thus far, he has given us no account of the truth-amplifiers to explain this. Might they be mere rhetorical flourishes? What more can he consistently say about them? The only promising proposal on offer, so far as I can tell, is (FA).

As further support for his view, Künne cites a passage from Frank Ramsey (Ramsey 1991, 10) in which the latter used the example, ‘the things he believed to be connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected by that relation’. In a footnote attached to the phrase ‘in fact’ Ramsey writes “[i]n a sentence like this ‘in fact’ serves simply to show that the *oratio obliqua* introduced by ‘he believed’ has now come to an end. It does not mean a new notion to be analyzed, but is simpl[y] a connecting particle” ((Ramsey 1991,

<sup>19</sup> To drive home the point, and show how Künne’s use of the evidence backfires, note that on his interpretation it would not matter if we replaced these words with the simpler, ‘he thought the earth revolves around the sun, and the earth revolves around the sun’. This deviates from Kotarbiński’s statement only by omitting ‘does’ following the second occurrence of ‘earth’ (and, as grammar requires, making the second ‘revolve’ agree with the subject). Try to read the second conjunct *naturally* without any inflection (say on ‘and’ or on a number of other words in it). I cannot do it. A similar problem emerges with Künne’s own prose in the next paragraph.

15n8) reading 'simply' for 'simple'). However, Ramsey, unlike Künne, is offering a positive thesis about the place of 'in fact': namely, it shows that the *oratio obliqua* clause specifying the belief has come to an end. Nevertheless, Künne might take solace from this much—according to Ramsey, the force-amplifier is doing nothing further here. And that might be enough to show, to the latter's satisfaction, that it is logically superfluous.

Ramsey's explanation is difficult to generalize. However, in the particular case he offers, it does compete with (FA) as an explanation. Thus, it is worth noting that his account fails even on its own turf. Ramsey's resolution turns on distinguishing the content of this belief from a belief whose content would be *the whole* of the following:

- (1) the things connected by certain relations were connected by those relations.

This utterly trivial belief is of course different from that ascribed in Ramsey's example (viz., that things are connected by certain relations). Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assign a connecting (perhaps conjunctive) role to 'in fact' in this context because the example does not contain any more typical English connective words (e.g., 'and' or 'but'). But Ramsey's case quickly falls apart. First, his claim no longer works if we modify the example slightly to read:

'he believed things to be connected by a certain relation *and*  
they were, *in fact*, connected by that relation'

'In fact' is no less natural here, and seems to be playing much the same role it did in the original example. Thus, even if it had to do double duty in Ramsey's example (because of the absence of any explicit connective), its primary role is not diminished when we use a different term to perform the role Ramsey cites. Second, the role given 'in fact' is ultimately futile for distinguishing (1) from the actual *oratio obliqua*. For *if* the content of the belief could have been that specified in (1), nothing, save the very same unnaturalness, prevents it from being:

- (2) the things connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected by those relations.

And in (2) the force-amplifier does not indicate that the belief has come to an end. The point here is that it is natural to parse Ramsey's original sentence so that the belief specification ends before the word 'were'. And that understanding would have been no less natural if the phrase 'in fact' had been absent. Thus, if we are to find a role for 'in fact' in that example, we

must look elsewhere. (I do not profess to know why Ramsey's, and his audience's, intuitive parsing is the natural one, but an educated guess might appeal to avoiding the attribution to a subject of so unlikely a remark as (1) or (2). Compare, for example, Russell's case of the guest remarking artlessly to the yacht owner 'I thought your yacht was larger than it is', and getting back the indignant, and clearly contrived, reply 'No, my yacht is not larger than it is!' No interjection of 'in fact' after 'than' is needed to construe 'than it is' as an intended worldly condition rather than as a constituent of what the first speaker was trying to express—just the point Russell makes.)

I noted earlier that a robust role for force-amplifiers might take one of two forms. Let us look again briefly at those options.

First, Evans (1982) and Wiggins (1999) regard the presence of the qualifier 'really' as basically a sentential operator. Their focus is quite different from the present one,<sup>20</sup> and the sentential contexts they treat prevent 'really' from being a force-amplifier there. But we could imagine extending both 'really' and the other amplifiers as operators governing sentences stating truth-conditions, and this would involve those amplifiers contributing genuine semantic content to their clauses.

Second, we might take force-amplifiers to be something like a Fregean assertion sign (Frege 1967, 35–36)<sup>21</sup> or a speech-act indicator, what has been variously called, among other things, a neustic (Hare 1952), mood (Dummett 1981), and function-indicator (Searle 1969). They do not contribute semantic content as such, but rather indicate something about how the clause over which they operate is to be taken.

It might be thought that the first choice places *robust* force-amplifiers in better stead. Semantic contributions are weighty. Moreover, if they do not make a semantic contribution, they must be merely *pragmatic* elements, and this throws them into a ragbag category in which they keep company with such at best marginal denizens as ordinary psychological associations. Nevertheless, although any decision here must be tentative, I believe it best to class force-amplifiers as indicators of how the clause is to be taken rather than components of the clauses themselves. The reason is that (on our generous assumption) the clauses in question are already semantically ambiguous, and ambiguous constructions already have (at least implicitly) a disjunction of their permissible meanings. Thus, everything a semantically differentiated interpretation of a truth-condition contains is present, even if only implicitly, before force-amplifiers come on the scene. For all that the amplifiers

<sup>20</sup> Roughly, and despite differences in their treatments, each is concerned with moving out of fictional contexts to existential claims about elements in the fiction. It is doubtful that anything they say about that will be directly relevant to our concerns.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. (Whitehead and Russell 1962, 8).

make a robust rather than a dismissive contribution to reading the clauses, for they make one of these interpretations unavoidable. This also has the advantage of avoiding what would be at least an embarrassment for a robust account. For, if force-amplification were conceived as making a semantic contribution, it would be unclear just what semantic contribution it could make given that the differentiated interpretation was already a (natural) possibility.

To see how neglecting this second prospect for robustness can skew the discussion, consider a comment by Mark Sainsbury (1999), weighing in on the issue about 'really' addressed by Evans and Wiggins. In the course of his exposition he states emphatically "that 'really', at least as used in ordinary English, makes no contribution to truth conditions" (Sainsbury 1999, 262). This looks like dismissive commentary. However, upon closer examination it is clear that he means that 'really' adds nothing *semantic* to truth conditions. This need not prevent it from making a contribution of another kind. In fact, a subsequent list of functions Sainsbury produces for ordinary uses of 'really' contains an item that comes close to (FA). He calls the function in question '*Pre-emptive strike against contrasting views*' (Sainsbury 1999, 263). This is precisely what (FA) states that force-amplifiers do when inserted in statements of truth-conditions or their satisfaction. Thus, if we're not to be stuck with the stark, inadequate list of choices of either adding something semantic to truth conditions or being of no informational significance, we must acknowledge that 'really' can *contribute* without adding excess semantic content.

What further evidence might be offered on behalf of (FA)? At this stage, perhaps the best argument available is to take a number of cases in which force-amplifiers have occurred in the literature and in which dismissive accounts of them and austere glosses of the whole phrases are highly implausible. Because there is nothing in the Kotarbiński passage to distinguish it from these other occurrences, if Künne is correct about that passage, we ought to be able to extend his negative assessment to these other occurrences. Thus, I briefly consider force-amplifiers as they have occurred elsewhere in the philosophical literature to illustrate further the weakness in their cavalier dismissals.

## 5.

I begin with Quine, who declares:

The sentence 'Snow is white' is true, as Tarski has taught us, if and only if *real* snow is *really* white (Quine 1970, 10, my emphases).

Unquestionably, 'real' is doing more for 'snow' than emphasizing that word. The intended contrast is probably with something in the area of fake



snow. But I certainly take it also to rule out, by implication, that the question is only whether the *word*—in this case ‘snow’—rather than some other *word*, is under consideration. If so, what plausible option is there to regarding ‘really’ as serving the same purpose for ‘is... white’? A semantically differentiated interpretation is irresistible here and fits well with what Quine says elsewhere about the determinants of truth.

A second instance. G. E. Moore (1962) asks us to imagine a friend who believes that he (Moore) has gone away for a holiday: “his belief that I have gone away cannot be true unless I actually have gone away.” And, in stressing that this is sufficient for its truth as well, Moore adds, “my having *actually* gone away for my holidays is both a *necessary* and *sufficient* condition for the truth of this belief” (Moore 1962, 299, first emphasis added). Unless this last claim is semantically differentiated it is hard to see how it could be necessary and sufficient, in the sense Moore intends, for the truth of the belief. Could the bare proposition (or sentence) ‘I have gone away’ be a truth-condition for the belief? To add to the implausibility of that interpretation, Moore’s restatement of the point in the second passage uses the non-propositional, substantial, phrase ‘my having *actually* gone away’ which is neither a proposition nor a sentence. Is not it clear that he is intending the same thing in both passages, although the second is a noun-phrase rather than a sentence, and thus not a prime candidate for just being another way to express the same thing as the described belief content of which ‘is true’ is predicated?

Next, Bertrand Russell (1999), attacking James’s pragmatic theory of truth, writes “... what I desire is not that the belief in solipsism should be false in the pragmatic sense, but that people should *in fact* exist” (Russell 1999, 77, my emphasis). And, in the same vein he states shortly thereafter that the pragmatists’ position “if they fully realized it, would, I think, be this: ‘We cannot know whether, *in fact*, there is a God or a future life, but we can know that the belief in God and a future life is true’” (Russell 1999, 78, my emphasis). Look again at the part of the latter quotation following the colon. No doubt, Russell is satirizing a view he takes to be hopeless. If we accept the view that the force-amplifier, ‘in fact’, makes no difference to the cognitive content of what is said, we preserve its content without loss if we reword it to read:

We can know that God exists and there is a future life is true,  
but we cannot know that God exists and that there is a future  
life.

This is close to self-contradiction. It is of the form:

$X$  can know that  $p$  is true, but  $X$  cannot know that  $p$ .

The one thing that saves it from being an outright inconsistency is the bare conceivability that one might be said to know the truth of something

(say, on authority) that one does not understand; so that one knows (or, can know) that *p* is true without knowing that *p*. However, even if this is intelligible, it is remote from anything Russell has in mind here. I cannot see any way to capture his intent without taking the existence of God and of a future life to have as their subject-matter conditions in the nonsemantic world. And if this is so, the interjection of 'in fact' would appear to be inserted precisely to drive that point home.

Next, William Alston (1996) gives as a first approximation to the view he wants to defend:

A statement (proposition, belief...) is true if and only if what the statement says to be the case *actually* is the case (Alston 1996, 5, my emphasis).

It is hard to see how anything less than a semantically-differentiated interpretation could capture Alston's point. To illustrate, suppose the statement in question is an assertion of the sentence 'the keys are in my pocket'. Now "what the statement says to be the case" is not *a statement* expressible with the sentence "the keys are in my pocket' is true' or *the proposition that the keys are in my pocket is true*. Rather what the statement says to be the case is simply *that the keys are in my pocket*, sans any predication of 'is true'. If the word 'actually' were no more than conversational filagree, as the dismissive outlook suggests, it would yield no direction about how the cognitive content should be taken. But much more seems to be going on. For on the right-hand side we have not only what the deflationist demands ('what the statement says to be the case'), but also an addendum to it ('actually is the case'). This second condition could not add anything to what has gone before unless Alston had in mind a semantically differentiated reading.

Next, in the first sentence of the passage below, Larson and Segal make clear without need for further commentary how they regard the force-amplifier in the second sentence:

[T]he property of being true or false depends on two things: what the sentence means and how things are in the extralinguistic world. Thus *Camels have humps* is true because it means what it does and because camels do, in fact, have humps. (Larson and Segal 1995, 5)

Finally, Christopher Hill (2002) takes it for granted that the use of the force-amplifier 'actually' makes it clear that the conditions under discussion are worldly, substantial ones rather than deflationary ones. He defends what he calls a *correspondence intuition* to the effect that "when a thought counts as true, it does so in virtue of the fact that the corresponding circumstance actually obtains." He then formulates this officially as:

“(CT) For any thought  $x$ ,  $x$  is true if and only if there is a state of affairs  $y$  such that (a)  $x$  semantically corresponds to  $y$ , and (b)  $y$  actually obtains” (Hill 2002, 39).

It is evident that Hill believes that (a) might have been understood austere-ly, or there would be no point to adding (b). What in (b) accomplishes its differentiated interpretation? It could not be just the *phrase* ‘ $y$  obtains’; that is as vulnerable to a deflationist construal as ‘ $x$  semantically corresponds to  $y$ ’ in (a). Rather he makes the thrust of his remark unmistakable by inserting the force-amplifier ‘actually’. This, then, enables him to state shortly thereafter that “[i]t is clear that (CT) is at variance with *every* theory that counts as a version of classical deflationism.”

This train of instances illustrates the quite general practice of using force-amplifiers to make as clear as possible one’s intention to appeal to inflationary truth-conditions. There is no ground for taking Kotarbiński’s use of them differently. Returning briefly to the particular case of his would-be deflationism, Künne initially bases his interpretation on his own account of Kotarbiński’s Reism, given by Künne, you may recall, as:

(K)  $x$  thinks truly  $\iff (x$  thinks that..., and...).

But Reism by itself does not install deflationism. The resort to an adverbial notion of truth, for whatever reason, tells us how to regard the truth-bearer, but it does not commit us to that bearer acquiring the status of being *truly so* in any particular way. (Indeed, the same could be said of Künne’s MOD.) Thus, the deflationary/inflationary status of Kotarbiński’s view depends on how he would regard the second conjunct on the right side of the biconditional in (K), not on the formulation *per se*. And it seems he makes his intentions as clear as we might hope for in the quoted passage at the beginning of §4. (FA) can, of course, stand without Kotarbiński’s support. But Künne’s commentary is instructive because it is typical of a certain kind of maneuver adopted for ignoring without toil the most direct way others have had to make plain their rejection of a deflationist construal of their remarks.

## 6.

The situations treated above are not the only problems confronting an austere gloss and a dismissive account of force-amplifiers. Here are some other tough cases.

Recall that we have a force-amplifier, playing just the role in a specification of a truth-condition or that one has been satisfied, even on some occasions in which no truth predicate or operator appears in the formula. This eliminates any opportunity for deflationist thesis (D2): whatever the specification of truth-conditions is doing, it cannot be showing how we may

state the left-side more simply. In this connection, consider again Ramsey's example:

the things he believed to be connected by certain relations were,  
in fact, connected by that relation.

On the surface this does not seem to be a compound. However, it is easy enough to replace it with a compound that still captures the spirit of Ramsey's example while having the added advantage of specifying an actual belief content. For example:

- (3) Fred believes that the species are connected by common descent  
and, in fact, they are connected by common descent.

While it may seem promising in a case such as 'it is true that snow is white' to say that 'snow is white' expresses the same thing, only more parsimoniously, no one will be tempted to say that 'snow is white' says the same thing as 'Fred believes that snow is white'. Still, in (3) we do have the same range of potential semantic values for the propositional clause in the first conjunct, and the same sort of nonsemantic condition in the second—the one expressing that the truth-conditions for Fred's belief are satisfied. Furthermore, because the point is just as strong without the interjection of the force-amplifier, let us provisionally delete it. Nevertheless, a differentiated interpretation seems mandatory here. The designator in the first conjunct, the content of Fred's belief, designates what is, broadly speaking, semantic. I am not supposing that Fred must have expressed, or even be able to express, his thought in words, not even *sotto voce*.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the phrase may be evaluable only on one's favorite psychosemantics, not on its linguistic twin. However, as long as we have a propositional content designated, expressions of semantic appraisal such as 'is true', 'is about', 'describes . . . as', and so on are appropriate characterizations. Moreover, we are prohibited from concluding that the proposition designated by those words (at least without consideration of the second conjunct) must be a (nonsemantic) *fact*—Fred may have a false belief. Thus, it is not an accident that the left-hand conjunct need not contain a truth predicate or operator to clarify the way it is to be read.

In spite of that, the satisfaction of the belief's truth-condition is specified in the second conjunct. That conjunct's semantic liaison will be some sort of worldly condition or *n*-tuple of particulars and features. What appears on the right-hand side is not destined *ex vi termini* to have as a value a semantic

<sup>22</sup> *Pace* Plato (in the voice of the stranger): "Thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind itself without spoken sound" (Plato 1961, 263e). Or, as Peter Geach once remarked about Hobbes, for him *ratio* is *oratio*.

component. What is specified there is quite literally something occurring ‘in deed’ rather than in thought or speech. So, it seems that an austere gloss is not in the offing. If we do not opt for a differentiated interpretation, in the absence of a new entrant we seem left without any suggestions for construing (3).

Next, there are also instances in which a first conjunct has a constituent designating a semantically evaluable item, but in which the satisfaction conditions specified in the second conjunct (with the help of force-amplifiers) are not *truth*-conditions. Strictly speaking, occurrences of interjections in these cases cannot be force-amplifiers as earlier defined. Nevertheless, they are close enough to our target cases to hold lessons for our subject:

- (4) The score called for the passage to be played slowly, and, *indeed* (/in fact), it was performed slowly. (/...and it *really* was performed slowly).
- (5) He painted the Duke with a crooked smile, and (/because), *indeed*, the Duke had a crooked smile.

A musical score and a portrait are representations, and thus admit semantic evaluation. Nevertheless, there is no way in which the musical performance or the Duke’s smile could be assimilated to the content of a score or to paint on canvass. Such cases drive home the point that Künne’s and/or Ramsey’s dismissive summaries of force-amplifiers do not apply in these strikingly analogous cases. Strangely enough, in these instances it is plausible to argue that the relevant expressions are inserted precisely for emphasis. (Recall that although neither Künne nor Ramsey explicitly give this as a role for amplifiers, it is a natural move on the part of those who hold that amplifiers add nothing to the interpretation or content of the clauses.) But what they emphasize in these cases can be nothing other than the worldly-conditions preventing a deflationary reading of them. I would venture that such cases seem not only to strengthen (FA), but also point toward a natural extension of it.

More bluntly still, sometimes the second conjunct, even when truth-conditions are in play, shows a departure from the semantically evaluable part. Thus:

- (6) Jan thinks he won the gold medal, but in fact he only won the silver.
- (7) The score called for the passage to be played largo, but, indeed (/in fact) it was played much too fast.
- (8) He painted the Duke with a crooked smile, but the Duke does not actually have a crooked smile.

It is difficult to believe that the interjections 'indeed', 'actually', and 'in fact' are performing a service so different in kind in (4)–(8) than those they were performing in (3). And in (4)–(8) it seems clear that they are ruling out any trace of doubt that the second conjunct takes us *from* a representational content *to* the part or aspect of the world relevant to the respective representation's evaluation. There may be a reduced urgency for force-amplifiers in such cases, but it has not been shown that they are wholly pointless; at worst they belabor something that typical audiences will have already taken for granted.

## 7.

Finally, a brief glimpse at how the terms we have enlisted for their role in (FA) enter into broader conflicts over representational theories. The simplest case is reference. Suppose for the sake of argument it is maintained that the following is an instance of a legitimate condition for reference:

- (10) 'N. Bourbaki' refers to N. Bourbaki only if N. Bourbaki exists.

Telescoping a number of anti-representationalist arguments, the deflationist view here would be that N. Bourbaki's existing comes to nothing more than facts about our usage of the name 'N. Bourbaki'. It does not invoke name-world relations.

While the interjection of the terms in the title does not settle the issue between representational and nonrepresentational theories of reference, any more than it settled the issue between deflationary and correspondence theories of truth, an extension of (FA) to these sorts of cases does, I am hopeful, eliminate one sort of maneuver which may have attracted nonrepresentationalists. That is, by interjecting one of these terms on the right-hand side of the conditional, and obtaining, say:

- (10') 'N. Bourbaki' refers to N. Bourbaki only if N. Bourbaki *actually* exists

a speaker may make plain her intention that the condition for reference in question be something, as we might say, worldly. This interpretation can be ruled out only if one holds that these terms cannot have any role in contributing to or indicating something about the content of the relevant clauses in which they appear. Since we have seen that view to have failed as a general prescription, we have good reason to reject it here. If we then extend our notion of a force-amplifier to the occurrence of such terms in any context supplying representational conditions, we could easily enough extend (FA) to representation generally:

(FA<sub>r</sub>) *Force-amplifiers, when used in constructions stating representational conditions (including conditions for truth and reference), or in indicating (/signifying) that the conditions have been satisfied, signify that the compound (or implicit compound) is to be given a semantically differentiated interpretation.*

In sum, the issues raised earlier can supply considerations bearing on the entire spectrum of deflationary semantic theories.

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